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Abstract 
To date, much of the analytical scholarship on policing in Africa has centred on 
non-state actors. In doing so, it risks neglecting state actors and statehood, 
which must be understood on their own terms as well as through the eyes of 
the people they supposedly serve. This article seeks to develop our theoretical 
and empirical understanding in this respect by exploring the contexts in which 
citizens seek to engage state police in Nigeria and South Africa. In doing so it 
highlights three particularly important uses that police contact may serve, that 
are currently being overlooked. State police can permit, authorize or limit 
crime control performed by others through informal regulatory intervention. 
They can exercise a unique bureaucratic power by opening a case which is 
valued as a record of right and wrongs to be used in the negotiation of 
everyday life, not simply as a means to legal prosecution. And finally, taking 
action ‘off the books’, the police can exercise a coercive power that can be 
termed ‘police vigilantism’, which citizens may try to harness for their own 
ends. We therefore argue that we should recognize the continued high public 
demand for the services of state police forces even in contexts where they fall 
short of expectations, and more closely analyse the ways in which people 
utilize and help to reproduce the police forces they condemn. 
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This is an exciting time to be exploring policing in Africa. Over the last decade, 
empirical and theoretical work on the issue has expanded rapidly and a vast 
expanse of literature written on everyday policing across the continent has 
amply demonstrated that policing is ‘very much more than what the Police1 
do’ (Baker, 2008: 230). 
Scholars like Bruce Baker (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b) and Alice Hills 
(2000) led much of the early comparative academic work on African policing 
and their findings made for stark reading: state police forces, they found, were 
undersized, unevenly spread, undertrained, mistrusted, politicized, 
unreconstructed and dedicated in the main to regime security and order 
maintenance (Baker, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Hills, 2000). Actual 
crime control in the experience of most African citizens, they argued, was 
often taken up by other agents such as local street patrols, ex-combatants, 
private security firms, religious figureheads and traditional leaders (Baker, 
2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Hills, 2000). 
In South Africa and Nigeria this literature deepened and complemented earlier 
policy-oriented work that focused on questions of Police reform in the wake 
of major political and social transitions, from apartheid and military rule 
respectively.2 It also formed a foundation for many of the subsequent 
explorations of what Lars Buur and Steffen Jensen (2004) would call ‘everyday 
policing’ in Benin (see, for example, Gratz and Kirsch, 2010), Mozambique 
(see, for example, Buur and Kyed, 2006; Kyed, 2009),  Nigeria (see, for 
example, Hagazi, 2008; Meagher, 2007; Nolte, 2007; Pratten, 2008, 2010),  
South Africa (see, for example, Buur, 2003, 2005, 2006a; Desai, 2004; Jensen, 
2005, 2008b), Tanzania (see, for example, Heald, 2006) and beyond. As well as 
illuminating the actual forms and practices of non-state policing, much of this 
literature analysed how state actors responded to policing performed 
elsewhere, by citizens or private agencies. It explored the effects of state 
opposition, sponsorship and general entanglement with these multiple forms 
of police work and asked what these relationships meant for our 
understanding of sovereignty, statehood and prevailing socio-cultural norms.3 
These perspectives are invaluable but ultimately they gave us only a limited 
insight into the role of the Police in day-to-day life. Although we agree with 
the argument that the state should not automatically be given ‘conceptual 
priority’ in policing studies (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 404), there is a danger 
that the established focus of policing studies across Africa risks analytically 
neglecting state actors and statehood, which must be understood on their 
own terms as well as through the eyes of the people they supposedly serve. 
Notably less has been written on everyday realities and modes of state 
policing. Yet in our research in Nigeria and South Africa we encountered 
recurring and varied situations in which ordinary members of the public 
initiated engagement with the Police in order to deal with issues of crime 
control and dispute resolution, even where plentiful alternatives existed. 
Building on the emergent literature on the Police from authors such as Julia 
Hornberger (2011) and Jonny Steinberg (2008, 2011, 2012)4 this article is an 
attempt to bring state institutions more comprehensively back in to our 
analysis of policing in Africa. To do so, we centre on ‘sought’ contact with the 
Police, as opposed to ‘unsought’ Police contact, or avoidance of Police contact 
altogether.5 More specifically, we concentrate on ‘sought’ contact made with 
the Police with the aim of tackling crime, as defined in state law.6 
Focusing primarily on our fieldwork in Nigeria and South Africa, we draw out 
the continued relevance of state police by looking closely at the contexts and 
purposes within which people engage them. We make three key arguments: 
first, the role of the Police as a regulatory authority is central—even in 
contexts of plural policing, people engage with the Police to legitimize or limit 
policing that is happening elsewhere. Second, the bureaucratic role of the 
Police is crucial—engagement with the Police is a means of creating records as 
well as taking action: people engage with the Police ‘on the books’ because 
the opening and closing of cases is an important part of the negotiation of 
relationships and challenges in everyday life. Third, state police forces 
continue to be relevant because, in ways which are often overlooked, they can 
compete with alternative security providers by mimicking their methods. 
People make frequent use of the Police to mediate on their behalf ‘off the 
books’ and some of this informalized action, which involves the exercise of 
illegal physical coercion nuanced by the simultaneous possession of legal 
authority, can be termed ‘police vigilantism’. Ultimately, these three forms of 
sought contact stem from people’s attempts to reconcile what the Police 
ought to do, what the Police usually do and what they need them to do in any 
given situation (Cooper-Knock, 2014b: 256).7 
 
Our findings are drawn from our collective research experience. Between 
2009 and 2011 Olly Owen undertook ethnographic work in a police division 
within a town of around 200,000 people, here pseudonymized as ‘Dutsin 
Bature’, in Nigeria’s ethnically and religiously mixed, predominantly 
agricultural savannah zone commonly referred to as the ‘Middle Belt’. During 
this period he also visited 32 other police stations and installations across 
Nigeria and conducted around 30 formal interviews with police officers of 
different ranks. Sarah Jane Cooper-Knock spent a total of 11 months in Durban 
researching three policing sectors between 2010 and 2013:8 one in a formerly 
Indian township under the Chatsworth Police Station; a second in a formerly 
black township under the KwaMashu Police Station; and the third in a 
formerly white suburb under the Berea Police Station. In total, she conducted 
over 170 interviews and seven focus groups. She also went on patrol with 
numerous neighbourhood watches in those areas.9 To protect the identity of 
those who wished to remain anonymous, all names in this article are 
pseudonyms. 
Why Nigeria and South Africa? 
Nigeria and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003: 
171) occupying a dominant place on the continent’s political-economic 
landscape. Between them they account for around 50 per cent of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s GDP10 and 24 per cent of its population.11 They are also both polities in 
dynamic states of social and political transition. While recent elections in both 
countries were categorized as free and fair, more substantive considerations 
show democracy is left wanting in each.12 One global ranking of democracy 
placed South Africa and Nigeria 60th and 110th, respectively.13 
The South African Police Service (SAPS)14 and the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) 
are as likely to be part of each country’s democratic problems as their 
solution.15 Historically, for political and practical reasons, the presence of the 
Police in South Africa and Nigeria has been notably uneven and often more 
concerned with regime maintenance than crime control.16 The Police in both 
countries have been damaged by their relationships with oppressive regimes. 
Moreover, the politicization and militarization of the Police has proved hard to 
shake in recent, more democratic times. Partly, this is because of the deep 
institutional legacies that previous regimes have left behind, and partly it is 
due to the appeal that such trends continue to have among sections of the 
political elite, the Police and the wider population (see, for example, 
Steinberg, 2011). 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that in each state, the ‘policing landscape’ 
(Marks and Wood, 2007) is crowded with private security actors and vigilant 
citizens policing what the state appears either unwilling or unable to police. 
The economic inequality that characterizes each state plays an important role 
in shaping these policing landscapes. In South Africa, this is clearly visible as 
the number of armed response units in the country continues to mushroom 
(PSIRA, 2011). In Nigeria, where private security guards are not permitted to 
carry arms and the affluent prefer instead to pay for attentive state policing, 
this divergence is perhaps less visible but no less present. In both countries, 
less affluent citizens are forced to resort to more-or-less organized self-help to 
police crimes and misdemeanours. 
The broad spread of normative frameworks that continue to co-exist and 
intermingle in both countries—sometimes in tension with the norms 
enshrined in their laws—also have an impact on the formation and 
functioning of those who perform policing outside the state. Thus, while 
social, cultural and political differences exist between these two countries, 
their policing landscapes remain comparable.17 The analysis we offer below 
will hopefully also raise research questions that can be fruitfully applied to 
other countries in Africa, and beyond. 
The limits of the criminal justice system 
Above, we highlighted some of the key issues that have been emphasized by 
authors studying the provision of state policing across Africa, which point to 
the broad conclusion that procedural justice in South Africa and Nigeria is 
flawed. Basic social conditions like high rates of poverty and illiteracy limit the 
ability of many to interlocute effectively with the criminal justice system. 
Furthermore, political realities mean that in both Nigeria and South Africa the 
ability of de jure rulings to override de facto power is often limited. Recently in 
Durban, for example, judges have issued no less than five High Court 
injunctions against the eviction of residents in Cato Crest18 but these 
injunctions have been systematically ignored by the state actors who have 
repeatedly torn down the shacks of local residents. As one member of the 
shack dwellers’ social movement Abahlali baseMjondolo noted, 
We have won many battles in court but the law did not bring us justice. You 
may win in court but you can still lose politically ... What is the point of being 
in court and getting the paper and still being evicted? Law or no law, powerful 
people can always win … they will go and tear down the shacks illegally but on 
the other hand the poor are expected to obey the law.19 
Bureaucratic and legal procedure can also be used as a means to dissemble, 
delay and overrule the petitions of citizens in both countries. Therefore, the 
court house and police station have become sites in which citizens’ cases are 
subject to seemingly endless deferral and irresolution.20 Neither, once a 
complainant has lost control of their case to the network of professional 
practitioners of law and statecraft are there many satisfactory ways of 
regaining control and accountability if events do not unfold to the plaintiff’s 
satisfaction. Even those who—because they know their rights or can afford 
good lawyers—are in a position to challenge the police on matters of legality 
and procedure, do so at the probable cost of police cooperation and goodwill 
and often achieve underwhelming change or redress, if they achieve anything 
at all. Ultimately, the accountability of officials and institutions in Nigeria and 
South Africa is extremely limited. Consequently, Nigerians and South Africans 
have become used to the injustice, lack of finality and ineffectiveness of the 
criminal justice system. These failures of policing and criminal justice have 
produced a weary suspicion that offenders will often go unpunished.21 
Thus, for a host of reasons, Nigerians and South Africans often assume that 
the criminal justice system will not function in the way they feel it should. 
Why, then, do people still engage with the Police? What are they bringing to 
the Police’s door?22 And what do they expect to be done about it? The 
remainder of this article explores these questions by delving into the 
relationships between citizens and the Police over issues of crime. 
Reappraising the Police’s regulatory power 
We begin by exploring how the Police are sought as a regulatory authority to 
legitimize and to limit policing that is being conducted by others. In an effort 
to understand and conceptualize policing ‘networks’ or ‘landscapes’ authors 
have made a useful distinction between the state’s roles as a provider and a 
regulator of policing (Crawford, 2006; Shearing and Johnston, 2013; Wood and 
Shearing, 2013). However, analysis of ‘regulation’ has usually focused on the 
de jure provision made for state regulation (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2005; 
Diphoorn, 2013), and the state’s capacity to make good on those formal 
provisions. As we demonstrate below, there is a need to expand this focus to 
explore the informal ways in which the Police act as regulators of policing: 
people seek the Police in an informal regulatory capacity in part because of 
the coercive force they can exercise—both legally and illegally—but also the 
persistent idea that the Police should be intervening in this capacity (Cooper-
Knock, 2014a). To structure our analysis of this formal and informal regulatory 
power, we follow Lars Buur and Steffen Jensen (2004) in distinguishing 
between ‘organizations’ and ‘formations’ of citizens engaged in everyday 
policing; the latter being more sporadic, less structured and more ephemeral 
versions of the former. 
Much of the writing that has emerged on non-state policing in South Africa 
and Nigeria has focused on policing organizations rather than policing 
formations. In South Africa, these include People Against Gangsterism and 
Drugs (PAGAD) (Desai, 2004), Mapogo a Mathamaga (Oomen, 2004), 
Amadlozi (Buur, 2008) and the D-Man Group (Buur, 2003). In Nigeria, these 
include the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) (Nolte, 2007) and the Bakassi 
Boys (Meagher, 2007).23 Such groups appear to offer a robust challenge to 
state sovereignty but many started from the premise that state police should 
be responsible for policing in the country, and consequently framed 
themselves as performing the work that the state should have been willing or 
able to perform. This remained true even when organizations pursued visions 
of statehood and security that lay far from those captured in each country’s 
respective laws and constitution. 
Many policing organizations that exercise violence have—at times, at least—
had fractious relationships with the Police and been branded as ‘criminal’ 
themselves. In Nigeria, prominent members of the Bakassi Boys were charged 
with murder as part of moves by the state to curb their political potency 
(Meagher, 2007), while the Police successfully took Kano’s Hisbah to the 
country’s Supreme Court to contest their right to policing powers. In South 
Africa, leading members of Mapogo a Mathamaga and PAGAD have been 
arrested in high-profile cases, the latter having been branded as ‘terrorists’ 
(Desai, 2004). PAGAD’s leader, Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim, was released in 2011 
after serving nine years in jail and two on parole and others in the movement 
continue to face charges.24 
Policing organizations, however, have also negotiated ‘permissive spaces’ 
(Cooper-Knock, 2014b) with portions of the Police. These negotiated spaces 
have enabled people—with varying degrees of certainty—to exercise violence 
without legal repercussion and conferred them with differing measures of 
legitimacy (Buur, 2006b: 736). Sometimes the relationships formed between 
organizations and the Police are tacit or the extent of them is hidden, even 
within the force itself. One police officer, for example, told Owen that on 
being transferred to a Lagos post from another part of the country he had 
been informed by longer-serving officers that, in that city, the accepted status 
quo was to maintain a functional coexistence with the OPC and generally 
refrain from interfering with their actions. In other cases, relationships 
between the Police and other policing organizations are purposefully visible, 
as they were when the Police launched joint night patrols with citizens in the 
conflict-prone city of Jos (Owen, 2013); when identity cards were distributed 
to mark out street patrollers as members of their local Community Police 
Forum in South Africa (Cooper-Knock, 2014b); or when groups of local citizens 
were recruited and paid as official vigilantes by local Government Councils in 
Nigeria while being briefed and regulated from State Police Commands 
(Owen, 2013). In all of these instances—both visible and invisible, subdued 
and spectacular—we see the Police being engaged to secure the permissive 
space in which citizens act and to mark it with legitimacy. 
However, the Police may also be called upon to limit or revoke the ‘permissive 
space’ in which people act. To see such manoeuvres in action we can turn our 
attention from police organizations to police formations. Since they are more 
ephemeral and less structured than policing organizations, policing formations 
are far more difficult to study. In policing literature within Africa, the little 
analysis that exists on such formations has focused on large-scale mobs that 
emerged to dispense acts of ‘mob justice’ and then dispersed with apparent 
impunity.25 In the South African context, Lars Buur (2009) has argued, these 
mobs evoke images of the ‘sovereign mobs’ that operated in the country’s 
townships towards the end of apartheid. Such collective acts were depicted by 
those Cooper-Knock interviewed and by media outlets as moments of popular 
sovereignty in which ‘the community’ mobilized against its constitutive 
outside ‘the criminal’. However, as demonstrated elsewhere (Cooper-Knock, 
2014a; Jensen, 2010), township residents were as likely to find themselves in 
‘intimate crowds’ as ‘sovereign mobs’, and the assault of suspected criminals 
had to be negotiated around the social, economic and political connections 
that, in reality, frequently bound these suspects to their would-be assailants.26 
Even in these seemingly archetypal moments of alienation from the state, 
there was engagement with the Police. 
Often, when such assaults were taking place in KwaMashu’s police precinct, 
the Police were called to intervene. They might be called by those with 
connections to the suspect who wanted assaults stopped regardless of the 
individual’s guilt. Alternatively, they might be summoned by someone—inside 
or outside the group of assailants—who felt that sufficient punishment had 
been administered. There was no guarantee that the Police would respond to 
such calls, of course, but the number of cases that interviewees described as 
ending in negotiation suggests that they frequently did. Nor was there any 
certainty about the ways that crowds would react upon the Police’s arrival. 
However, in many cases relayed by interviewees, those involved relinquished 
their hold on the suspect in question even though they would not brook any 
attempt by the Police to arrest them as assailants (Cooper-Knock, 2014a). 
Believing that they were acting in lieu of a state that was not willing or able to 
do so, they demanded that the Police ‘pay the necessary respect’ to them and 
quietly pick up the duties they had apparently neglected, by taking the 
suspect who had been assaulted into custody (Cooper-Knock, 2014b: 127). 
What we see here, then, is the negotiated use of the Police to regulate the 
space in which citizens could perform acts of policing and justice themselves. 
As the Police establish, legitimize, narrow and close the space in which other 
forms of policing happen, they maintain a regulatory role. In recent 
criminological literature, the ‘regulatory state’—imbued with capacity, voice 
and authority—is seen as key to the practice of ‘good governance’ 
(Braithwaite, 2000). Yet, the accounts above do not sit easily with classic ideas 
of ‘good governance’. Rather, individual state institutions and individuals, 
utilize their power in discretionary, unpredictable and sometimes illegal ways 
(see, for example, Chalfin, 2011). 
So why have these two police forces retained an important regulatory role? 
For all their problems, the Police have the bureaucratic and coercive power 
(legal and illegal) to authorize and de-authorize, limit and support other 
policing actors (Cooper-Knock, 2014a). They also have the symbolic power as 
state representatives to intervene (Cooper-Knock, 2014a), because despite its 
limitations, the presence of the state is still widely desired by citizens in both 
countries. The idea of the state in South Africa played a persistently important 
role in shaping the form and function of anti-apartheid protest during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, as people sought alternatives to the reality imposed by 
the National Party (Adler and Steinberg, 2000). Much was promised to South 
African citizens at the advent of democracy in 1994 that relied on state 
provision, state resources or state redistribution. Subsequently, the state has 
frequently been the focal point of public protests (Ballard, 2005). In 2012, 
there was a total of 470 so-called service delivery protests (Mail and 
Guardian, 12 February 2014). 
In Nigeria, by contrast, the state has long held a contradictory place in the 
public imagination, both castigated for its failure and judged against its own 
claims to omnipotence. While its colonial foundations gave it a narrow base of 
legitimacy, oil-fuelled expansion and military-led developmental planning (see 
Apter, 2005) produced both great aspirations and the simultaneous failure to 
fulfil them. Even after a period of neo-liberal adjustment (see Akinkugbe and 
Joda, 2013) Nigeria retains a strongly statist aspect, while public expectations 
continue to centre on the promise, if not the fulfilment, of the provision of 
public goods by the state (witness the continual power of electricity and fuel 
subsidy provision as mobilizing issues of popular mass politics). The state as a 
persistent—and persistently legitimate—imaginary revalidates the demand 
for state policing in a manner that private-sector or communitarian 
alternatives cannot replicate. 
Altogether, it seems that while much of the Police’s authority is based on their 
formal-legal roles, their actual regulation is often performed informally. Such 
complexity fits with some difficulty into discussions of the role of the state in 
‘steering’, ‘rowing’ and ‘anchoring’ policing in developed and developing 
countries across the globe (Crawford, 2006). 
Resolving disputes ‘on the books’ and reassessing police statistics 
Although people in South Africa and Nigeria rarely trust the Police in a 
protective or investigative capacity, citizens continue to engage with them in a 
bureaucratic capacity.27 Understanding this engagement is important: The 
procedural, administrative role of the SAPS and the NPF has too often been 
dismissed as a remnant function—the bureaucratic remainder of a wider, 
more active role for the police (Cooper-Knock, 2014b). However, the 
importance of the state as the creator of the official record on crime should 
not be underestimated. Record keeping is a key ‘language of stateness’ in and 
of itself (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001: 21). People in Nigeria and South Africa 
recognize its importance when they instrumentalize the opening and closing 
of criminal cases. Some of this instrumentalization repurposes the Police, 
turning a formal institution with the ostensible purpose of enforcing 
retributive justice in the name of the state into an agent of restorative and 
reintegrative communitarian justice (Owen, 2013). The police station is clearly 
able to imitate the ‘civil’ dispute resolution functions otherwise presumed to 
be the domain of other traditional or communal institutions (see, for example, 
Okereafoezeke, 2003), which themselves are presumed to thrive in part as a 
result of continued failures of policing. As such, we must reconsider our 
reading of police statistics, and challenge the notion that criminal cases that 
do not conclude in the successful prosecution of a suspect are necessarily an 
indication of failure in any simplistic or absolute sense. 
For many citizens we encountered in our fieldwork, the procedural role of the 
Police forms part of the wider negotiation of social, economic and political 
relationships. For them, opening a case was valuable because it offered the 
promise of ‘moral fixity’ (Owen, 2013). Opening a case embedded and 
crystallized moral positions inherent in the Police’s categorization of 
‘complainant’ and ‘accused’ or ‘suspect’. Through the act of opening a case 
and their statement to the Police they framed the issue under complaint, 
identified another group or individual as the ‘suspect(s)’, and positioned 
themselves as ‘victim’. Such documentation not only framed the exchange in 
question, but also any others that might follow. 
Some of those we spoke with opened cases simply as a precaution, so that 
they could more easily take action should an act of aggression be repeated. 
Sibongile for example, was an informal settlement resident in Durban in her 
teens. While her parents worked and could afford to send her to school, her 
neighbours were unemployed, like 24 per cent of South Africans.28 Jealousy 
between the families grew, and ultimately there was an arson attack on 
Sibongile’s house. Proactive police action would have exacerbated these 
relationships further and this was not what Sibongile’s family sought. They 
had opened a case simply in case ‘anything should happen’ in the future and 
were satisfied that it remained inactive ‘on the books’ for future recourse. 
Similarly in Nigeria, the Police frequently reassured complainants with the 
words ‘don’t worry, we have it on file’. Such comments were intended to 
convey that even if the Police did not immediately act upon their case, they 
served as a silent witness to the breakdown of relations, officially 
documenting both victim and aggressor. In this way, initiating a complaint 
could be used as a pre-emption, another installation in a social drama passing 
through its police phase. 
In other cases, citizens sought to mobilize the Police more proactively, 
strategically enlisting their intervention—both licit and illicit—to aid in the 
partisan negotiation of disputes. In Nigeria, for example, an archetypal case 
would be one in which a carpenter who had been paid money to make 
furniture, allegedly kept the money without producing the goods. An 
unsatisfied customer would pay a visit to the Police to open a Criminal Breach 
of Trust case and, in doing so, recruit the Police’s help to resolve the issue. 
Should they help him to recover the money or otherwise reconcile the parties 
involved, he would likely withdraw the case and pay the Police a small fee, 
and the suspect would recover their liberty and clean record. If not, he could 
push the formal process further. Of course, the Police need not be the only 
actors involved in such negotiations. Rather, opening a case was just one 
means among many by which people might seek to resolve perceived wrongs 
or ongoing disputes. 
As we might expect, the framing of social disputes in law and the utilization of 
the Police to mediate in conflict was contested (Hornberger, 2004). This 
contestation was evident in the case of Sajni, a woman in her 30s who lived in 
a formerly Indian township. Sajni lived in a flat with her family. A dispute arose 
with her neighbour, Rasheed, who often ran errands for her, when he stole 
some of her money and used it to buy alcohol. Upon finding out that he had 
‘drunk the money’, Sajni accosted him at home, but she was forcefully 
removed from her neighbour’s flat by his wife, who allegedly assaulted her, at 
which point she retaliated in kind. The physical consequences of this incident 
were minor but the social and (for Sajni) economic consequences were 
significant. In response, Sajni’s neighbours called contacts that they had in the 
Police, seeking to arrest Sajni for assault and, by so doing, securing their 
position as victims in the exchange. Sajni recalled that the Police who arrived 
‘did not want to hear my story, because [Rasheed’s son] was repairing 
somebody’s vehicle from the police station’ (Cooper-Knock, 2014b: 217). Her 
neighbours’ advantage in the exchange was lost when they arrived at the 
station, however, because Sajni was able to reach out to a policeman there 
who attended her church, and was superior in rank to her neighbours' 
contacts. Entering the fray, he stated that Sajni’s statement disproved the 
accusations against her and insisted that the case be dropped. Furthermore, 
he informed Sajni that she could open a case for theft and assault against 
Rasheed and his wife, which Sajni promptly did, regaining the legal and moral 
upper hand (Cooper-Knock, 2014b). 
Following this case through to prosecution, however, would have posed 
problems for Sajni who, by keeping the case open, also kept the conflict 
between herself and her neighbours alive. Consequently, she dropped the 
charges. ‘I wanted peace’, she stated, ‘if I had not dropped the charges it 
would have been an ongoing thing and every time I would have seen them a 
remark would have been said or something would go on. Now with the 
charges dropped we became friends.’ Ultimately, she argued, ‘we are 
neighbours [and] you cannot open charges and do funny things to people 
because if you are in need the neighbours are the first [people you call on]’. 
After their reconciliation, Sajni and Rasheed’s wife often assisted each other 
running errands and when Sajni later clashed with her mother-in-law, it was 
Rasheed’s wife who defended her reputation and helped to mediate between 
the two. ‘But now imagine if we were in a conflict going to court and coming 
back’, Sajni reflected, ‘it would be something worse’ (Cooper-Knock, 2014b: 
217). Sajni’s case clearly demonstrates the instrumental use that could be 
made of both opening and withdrawing a case, and the vital role that ‘contact 
calling’ within the Police could play in these negotiations (Cooper-Knock, 
2014b). Contacts could be made through a variety of social, political and 
economic bonds or exchanges. These were personal, particularistic 
connections. However, their value depended upon the official rank and 
precinct of the police officer in question. Thus, we witness a mix here of the 
particularistic and the institutional at play (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 
2006). 
Personal contacts were important. The Police could refuse to categorize an act 
as a criminal offence and thereby block a would-be complainant’s access to 
‘on the books’ action.29 When considering whether to open a case, the Police 
usually weighed up a series of considerations including public demand; 
personal gain; the utility of dealing with a minor issue before it disturbed the 
peace and attracted the attention of senior officers; and the risk of becoming 
ensnared in ongoing, intractable, low-level conflicts. In this mix, a personal 
sense of obligation could be powerfully persuasive. 
Sajni’s goal in this instance was to restore relationships with her neighbours, 
preferably in a way that maintained her own status as victim in the exchange. 
This, rather than the successful prosecution of Rasheed, was her ultimate aim. 
Similarly, Sibongile wanted her case to remain dormant ‘on the books’ in case 
something should happen in the future. Such strategies, which were common 
among our respondents, prompt a reassessment of police statistics. 
The difficulties of using police statistics as a means of estimating crime are 
well known: they may be affected by underreporting, unintentional mistakes 
or intentional fabrication by the Police (Altbeker, 2007). Previous critiques 
implicitly assume, however, that users of the Police want suspects who have 
been arrested to be successfully prosecuted. It was with this in mind that 
South Africa’s Law Commission (SALC) sought to assess the degree to which 
the criminal justice system was working by tracking criminal cases that had 
begun between January 1997 and April 1998 through the system until October 
1999 (SALC, 2000). Ultimately, they reported, only 3 per cent of aggravated 
robbery cases in Durban had ended in a conviction. Around 88 per cent had 
not reached court. This was remarkably similar to the situation in Nigeria, 
where we can cite a sample from ‘B’ Division’s Information Book, stored in the 
Division Crime Bureau (DCB), in which all the outcomes of cases were formally 
recorded (we should be mindful that the incidents officially logged as cases 
were usually less than half of those that were brought to the police station). 
Over a 25 day period between 5 and 30 June 2010, the statistics for the 
Information Book were as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. B Division Information Book entries between 5 and 30 June 2010, 
Dutsin Bature. 
Outcome Number of cases Percentage of total 
Terminated 1 1.3 
Keep in view 7 9.3 
Case closed 0 0 
Under investigation 11 14.6 
Transferred to state CID 1 1.3 
Charged to court 2 2.6 
Vide entry/amended 9 12 
Outcome not recorded 43 57.3 
Total 74 100 
Note: The terms listed are the official categories. ‘Vide entry’ refers to 
important amendments referring to outstanding cases which are designated 
to be officially recorded. 
As Table 1 shows, only two of the cases in question had been transferred to 
the courts, the supposed telos for all cases. While a number of others may 
reach that point eventually—namely those recorded as being under 
investigation, or those logged as more serious crimes and transferred to the 
CID—virtually none had been officially ended in other ways (the categories of 
Terminated and Case closed). Instead, the majority of cases had simply 
disappeared from the written record. 
The cases that we have explored above give us another explanation, beyond 
incompetence and corruption in the criminal justice system, to help us 
interpret these statistics. In many cases in Dutsin Bature, this ‘vanishing’ from 
formal procedure represented a case in which a negotiated settlement has 
been tentatively reached or a particular misdemeanour appeared to have 
abated. In such situations, the case lay dormant, a latent threat kept in 
reserve should an understanding be broken, and the misdemeanour in 
question start once more. The lack of finality gave the format its flexibility. 
Undoubtedly, our conclusions above should not lead us to overlook or 
minimize the importance of flaws in the criminal justice system but, if we are 
using such statistics to assess the ‘success’ of the such systems, we need to 
move with caution, appreciating the multiple reasons why people might open, 
close or abandon a case with the Police. 
 
Resolving conflicts ‘off the books’ and introducing the ‘police vigilante’ 
 
As Egon Bittner’s (1967) research into ‘policing on Skid Row’ demonstrated, 
the exercise of discretion is a vital part of everyday police work. It is, as Walter 
Benjamin (1966) reminded us, what places the Police in a liminal space 
between law makers and law enforcers: the Police are given extensive leeway 
to choose what they police or choose not to police. The behaviours and 
interventions we explore below, however, go beyond such legal freedoms by 
analysing the illegal exercise of force by the Police. We chose the term ‘police 
vigilantism’ in this instance as a direct challenge to the definition of vigilantism 
held by Les Johnston (1996),30 which only applies to those who are not 
members of the state’s law enforcement. By using this term, we want to 
suggest that the Police can behave in ways that mimic non-state actors who 
are termed ‘vigilantes’.31 At the same time, the fact that they are state actors 
continues to matter. Like Kanti Kotecha and James Walker (1976) we want to 
highlight the ways in which the ideas, powers and resources that surround 
those who hold de jure power in a state can be used to justify and enable the 
exercise of both legal and illegal force.32 
A great deal of research into policing across the globe has concluded that the 
state’s criminal justice system can be an ineffective and blunt instrument that 
triggers more trouble than it resolves in the midst of delicately balanced, 
intimate relationships (see, for example, Anderson, 1994; Bourgois, 2003; 
Jensen, 2010). But it does not necessarily follow that it is therefore abandoned 
wholesale in favour of alternative organizations or formations. Citizens might 
equally attempt to harness the power of the Police informally, and avoid the 
formal procedures of the criminal justice system. Interestingly, in both South 
Africa and Nigeria, where reported faith in the police is notoriously low and (in 
the case of Nigeria at least) reliance on traditional or neo-traditional social 
institutions notably high, the potential utility of the Police in informally 
disciplining social behaviour does not halt at the door of domesticity and 
kinship. For example, on two separate occasions, Owen witnessed families in 
Dutsin Bature bringing teenage sons to the Police to be disciplined. On the 
first occasion, a young teenager who had pilfered money from his mother’s 
handbag was brought to the DCB by his family for punishment. After a period 
of interrogation, caning, slaps, stress positions, threats and humiliations 
(which also included a few questions to ascertain if there was some welfare or 
other reason to explain his actions), the boy was returned to his family tearful, 
abject and apologetic. In the second case, an older teenager who slapped his 
mother was brought by his brothers to a CID officer of their acquaintance. This 
assault represented a gross breach of taboo, as attested to by the chorus of 
disgust from the female officers at the station’s counter—‘your mother wey 
born you?’ ‘Do you know what it is to carry child?’ Faced with this more 
serious offence, the Police chained the young man in a Special Anti-Robbery 
Squad cell for one hour while the detainees—suspected dangerous criminals 
some of whom had been there for several months—were expected to inflict 
their own punishments on him. During this punishment the CID officer chatted 
to the researcher and his colleagues at the front counter until he deemed it 
time to retrieve the man in question. Crucially, both these cases remained 
firmly in the informal realm; no paperwork or official process was invoked. It is 
also noteworthy that the efficacy of using the Police to discipline people in 
this context relies precisely upon the unpopularity and fear of the Police to 
work. 
In both of these cases the complainants had evidence of their suspects’ 
involvement that would have been accepted within a court of law had they or 
the Police preferred that course of action. However, this was not always the 
case. In some instances people sought police vigilantism precisely because 
their proof of guilt was incommensurate with that demanded by the criminal 
justice system. Cebile, for example, was a KwaMashu resident in her 30s. In 
2009, Cebile’s house was broken into by a group of young men, one of whom 
had a gun. While their faces were covered, she claimed that she recognized 
two of those involved. However, she recalled, ‘when I went to the Police they 
said I don’t have proof’. Therefore, although she opened a case, those she 
suspected were not pursued. With this formal procedure exhausted, she 
turned to her neighbour who was a policeman at another police station in 
Durban. She explained, ‘he goes and face them and tell them “if you do this 
again you will die”’. While Cebile was still despondent about her formal case, 
she was grateful that her neighbour had ‘used their uniform to scare people’. 
Again, we see here that ideas that surround the Police are important in this 
exchange. John Bayley (1994: 34) has argued that the Police uniform stands as 
testament to the fact that ‘the regime of law exists’. However, its 
effectiveness in this instance was its ability to signify the real threat of 
extrajudicial violence (Owen, 2013). Cebile did not favour the illegal exercise 
of violence by the Police in general, and her preference was for a working 
criminal justice system, but in its absence she sought ‘personalized’ 
relationships with ‘forceful’ police officers (Hornberger, 2013). In doing so, she 
helped to further the creation of a police force that she had, in principle, 
opposed. 
These cases reveal moments when police action ‘off the books’ was 
demanded and delivered. It is worth stressing, however, that this form of 
intervention was not ultimately under the control of the citizens who 
demanded it. The Police might refuse to intervene in a case to avoid becoming 
ensnared in personal, protracted conflicts. Clara, for example, lived in a flat in 
the Chatsworth precinct. She had her necklace stolen at knife-point by a 
neighbour’s son, Blake. Not wanting to undermine her close relationship with 
this neighbour—and being aware of Blake’s reputation for violence—she 
asked the Police to secure the return of her necklace without opening a case 
against Blake. However, as her neighbour recalled, the police officers in 
question responded,  
You have to speak to his mother, his parents, and see what they can do to 
help because we want to help you and you don’t want to charge him and so 
we can’t do anything. Only if you tell us we can take a statement and then 
arrest him and charge him [will we help]. 
In this instance, the Police rejected Clara’s efforts to use them for leverage 
while constraining their ability to act as law enforcers. Ultimately, ‘off the 
books’ action happened at their behest (Cooper-Knock, 2014b: 194). 
In fact, citizens could not control the form or extent of punishment that the 
Police decided to inflict in any one case. That much is demonstrated by the 
case of Divya, a resident in the Chatsworth precinct in her 50s. Divya’s 
husband had been an alcoholic who frequently assaulted her when drunk—
usually at the weekends. Her response to such assaults had become 
routinized: she would call the Police who would give him a ‘few slaps’ and put 
him in the cells to ‘sleep it off’, releasing him the following day without 
opening a case against him. One Sunday, however, Divya’s husband did not 
return. Eventually, Divya found him in the government hospital in a coma. He 
would never walk again and, she claimed, died of his injuries two years later. 
The Police, Divya felt, had broken their tacit understanding: ‘they were meant 
to hit him, but not like that. On the legs, not the head’, she stated. Divya later 
tried to bring a case against the Police but while she received some fiscal 
compensation, she believed that the officers in question had not been 
seriously punished: One of them, she heard, had subsequently been 
promoted. This case predated the transition from apartheid but, for Divya, 
little in the Police had changed since then. She had not enlisted the Police ‘off 
the books’ again but her son had since been the subject of another act of 
police vigilantism that, she claimed, had left him seriously injured. The police, 
then, had a capacity for violence that citizens sought to harness, but could not 
always control. 
Conclusion 
State police forces remain relevant even in contexts where they are 
undersized or otherwise problematic in terms of their legitimacy or capacity. 
The examples above from everyday life in Nigeria and South Africa, give 
glimpses into who uses the Police and how, allowing us to draw some 
tentative conclusions. We are aware of the limitations and the potential for 
variation outside our localized samples. Undoubtedly, intersecting socio-
cultural, political and economic contours also guide exactly who is more or 
less likely to use the Police, just as they guide who uses private security guards 
or vigilantes. In South Africa, for example, the reasons why people wanted to 
open a case were discernibly shaped by class, as more affluent citizens had 
insured their possessions. For them, opening a case was a means of officially 
verifying a course of events so that they could make an insurance claim; 
meanwhile poorer citizens were more likely to open cases as part of a wider 
negotiation of social, economic and political relationships. Intersecting with 
this class-based logic were people’s historical-political interactions with the 
Police, which had invariably been shaped by race. In Nigeria, it seems evident 
that those with particular social access to police officers, particular types of 
urban dwellers33 and the literate, more frequently sought police contact. 
However, much more research is needed on these contours, and on the 
pathways and intermediaries by which members of the public often access the 
state police. We equally need more research on where cases have been 
before they enter the station, and where they go afterwards, if we are to 
understand fully the interlocution of state policing with other modes of crime 
control and dispute resolution. 
Yet even so, it is clearly inadequate to assume that state police are moribund, 
or that their focus on regime protection or ‘high’ policing has extinguished the 
demand for them to intervene in everyday crime control and dispute 
resolution. Neither, at least in the contexts in which we worked, did they find 
their prime relevance in their official regulation of other organized structures, 
even when they were tasked with such regulation. Instead, state police forces 
are routinely inserted into the fine grain of everyday social life via their 
continued utility in crime control and related mediation. And it is clear, from 
the steady stream of complainants to Dutsin Bature’s ‘B’ Division and the flow 
of calls to Durban’s stations, that this is often a relationship of the public’s 
initiation. 
We have recognized three significant modes by which this is done. First, the 
Police permit, limit and authorize crime control performed by others, often 
through informal interventions. Second, they use their bureaucratic power to 
legitimize and fix people’s normative positions in disputes by opening criminal 
cases, providing leverage in the negotiation of everyday conflicts and the 
rarely utilized possibility of criminal prosecution. Third, just as non-state 
actors can gain power by mimicking the state (Lund, 2006), the Police (while 
being a legally constituted authority) may (in whole or part) mimic the 
informal solutions of vigilance movements in acts of ‘police vigilantism’.34 
What perhaps most powerfully unites the points above is the continued 
power of the Police as an imaginary. What the Police do is shaped by public 
demand, and what the public demand is in turn shaped by what they think 
should be provided. Both researchers’ fieldwork experiences were strongly 
coloured by citizens’ representations of what the Police should do, 
simultaneously deployed with a deep awareness of what they were likely to 
do, which doubtless did not conform to the ideal. For many, the idea of the 
state as an anchor of security provision persists, in spite of its many failings 
(Loader and Walker, 2007). This ideational legitimacy is something that 
neither undemocratic or dictatorial government, nor abuses of state power, 
nor the market, nor movements of popular sovereignty, have entirely 
displaced.35 Nigerian and South African publics’ proclivities to come back to 
the Police reflect wider understandings of state and public relations generated 
from the study of security. In as much as Hansen and Stepputat (2001) 
demonstrated that sovereignty, conventionally presumed to be a matter of 
official status, should better be understood as also de facto and fluid, 
ethnographic research on how publics utilize the Police demonstrates that 
legitimacy, more often presumed to be a category rooted in popular morality, 
is also significantly de jure, remaining strongly connected in the imagination to 
the enduring ideal of the state and the reference-point of its law. The idea of 
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Notes 
The authors would like to thank both anonymous reviewers and Professor 
Mary Bosworth for their helpful feedback. 
Throughout this article, reference to the Police when referring to the state 
police will be capitalized. 
 
In South Africa see, for example, Bruce (1997); Newham (1999); Rauch (2000). 
In the Nigerian context, see www.cleen.org. 
On statehood, see Gratz and Kirsch (2010) and Heald (2006). On sovereignty, 
see Cooper-Knock (2014b) and Jensen (2010). On socio-cultural norms see 
Pratten (2010). 
This, in turn, is a part of a wider literature that is re-focusing on state actors 
and statehood in Africa. See, for example, Bierschenke and Olivier de Sardan 
(2014); Chalfin (2011); and Roitman (2005, 2006). 
The useful distinction between ‘sought’ and ‘unsought’ Police contact was 
made by Clancy et al. (2001). 
We acknowledge that this is only one aspect of the multiple roles of police 
forces, but it is the ideational role and raison d’etre of police in both the eyes 
of the public and their self-image, and also that part of their remit which is 
most specifically contested or competed for by alternative security providers. 
Meanwhile from the perspectives of officers themselves, the considerations 
are similar, only with the additional consideration of what it is realistically 
possible to do without risk to person, position or the institution’s own 
carefully-conserved authority (Owen 2013). 
Subsections of the wider precinct for which each police station is responsible. 
The authors would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for 
funding, and ‘F’ Department, Nigeria Police Force, for supporting, research in 
Nigeria. 
World Bank Data Bank 2012 http://data.worldbank.org/. 
World Bank Data Bank 2012 http://data.worldbank.org/. 
In the South African context, see Mattes (2002). In the Nigerian context, see 
for example, Adebanwi and Obadare (2011); Omotola (2010). 
http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/?page_id=738. 
The SAPF is controlled nationally, like the NPF, but in South Africa there are 
also Metro police units that are controlled provincially. The Metro police, 
however, have a limited mandate and largely focus on traffic offences. 
As the Marikana Massacre in South Africa in August 2012—and the Police 
cover-ups during the ensuing commission investigating the massacre—
demonstrate. Hills (2012) contends that wider political conditions may render 
policing in Nigeria structurally impervious to reform. 
Or, in Jean-Paul Brodeur’s (2007) terms, ‘high’ rather than ‘low’ policing. 
We appreciate that use of the Police is intimately tied to historical and cultural 
repertoires of interaction with both the Police and the broader state, as well 
as other influential social norms, but a full depiction of these broader contexts 
in Nigeria and South Africa is not within the scope of this article. 
http://www.ngopulse.org/press-release/defense-abahlali-basemjondolo-
members (last accessed 23 April 2014). 
Cooper-Knock (2013) On predictability: The everyday struggles of shack 
dwellers in South Africa [blog]. Available at: 
http://democracyinafrica.org/predictability-everyday-struggles-shack-
dwellers-south-africa/ (accessed on 3 April 2014). 
And in which even their own counsel can be complicit; during fieldwork the 
author encountered a case where a group of non-English-literate cattle 
herders in Dutsin Bature had been encouraged to continue a largely pointless 
trespass litigation for two years by their lawyer whose purposes the fees 
lucratively served. 
Of course, some feel that the criminal justice system would still be 
unsatisfactory even if it fulfilled its mandate: they not only object to how the 
Police appear, but also the legal and policy framework that dictates how and 
what they are supposed to regulate. Such opinions are voiced in the recurrent 
debates over centralized control versus federalized devolution of policing in 
Nigeria, as well as more radical critiques (both secular and religious) of state 
police forces; however it is not our intention to deal with those in this article. 
Literally as well as figuratively, as in Dutsin Bature, Police had almost no patrol 
capacity and acted in the main in reaction to complainants bringing their issue 
to the station. 
These groups, established in the 1990s and early 2000s differ from the (older) 
Vigilante Group of Nigeria, (contemporary) Hisbah in Kano, and (newer) 
Civilian JTF in Borno State, all of which either originated as or have since been 
officially incorporated as official and state-funded policing auxiliaries. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-21-is-the-revived-gentler-kinder-pagad-
doing-gods-work. 
For example, in the South African context, see Buur (2009); Jensen (2010). 
Furthermore, much has been said about the impunity of the mob. However, 
for those who participated in smaller scale acts of street justice (particularly 
those who had led it) impunity had to be negotiated, it was not guaranteed. 
Prior police contact could help in these negotiations and residents had been 
known to open a case against a suspect prior to assaulting them, which would 
help to frame the negotiations that ensued. 
It may be argued that the police differ from Weber’s ideal-type rational 
bureaucracies due to the active, interventionist and discretionary nature of 
their work. However as Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014) point out, 
Weber also stated that most actual bureaucracies do not cleave to their own 
ideal image; the most important elements, however – their professional, 
impersonalized, disinterested and processual aspects – are central to the self-
understanding of police forces. 
http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02114thQuarter2013.pdf 
(last accessed 20 April 2014). 
As an officer of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad in Dutsin Bature’s ‘B’ Division 
told a departing complainant, ‘Nigeria wants peace’. 
As discussed elsewhere, this is not the only difficulty with Johnston’s (1996) 
definition. And, indeed, the difficulty of defining vigilantism has pushed some 
to question the utility of the term altogether (Buur and Jensen, 2004). As 
explained above, however, we find it useful in this context. Moreover, we 
agree with Johnston that acts vigilantism need not necessarily be illegal—they 
are simply attempts to prevent infractions of order that may or may not be 
enshrined in state law. 
Historically around the 1980s in South Africa, ‘vigilante’ took on a distinctive 
meaning, referring to conservative groups who acted against those seen as 
challenging apartheid’s socio-political status quo. This narrower rendering of 
the term is not the ‘vigilantism’ to which we refer here. Equally, vigilantism in 
these contexts should not necessarily be equated with law-lessness, but with a 
general greater preoccupation with popular ideas of justice and legitimacy 
than with state law. 
Our usage of the term ‘police vigilantism’ is equally informed by Beatrice 
Jauregui’s (2010, 2013) employment of the concept in analysing the extra-
judicial violence of ‘encounter’ incidents in India. 
Particularly those residing in newer or more planned parts of the town, 
constituting a civic public, as opposed to both rural dwellers and those in 
Dutsin Bature’s old town with its strong traditional institutions, and which 
some officers spoke of as a ‘no-go’ area except when invited to intervene. 
We suggest this is a more fruitful way to understand phenomena such as 
extra-judicial corporal and capital punishments by police than are human 
rights and other discourses which struggle to explain this deviance from 
enforcing the law when they disregard the critical role of public demand for 
vigilante policing. 
In this regard it is interesting to speculate on the applicability to policing of the 
argument Bodea and LeBas (2014) make regarding public perceptions of the 
legitimacy of taxation in Nigeria; that public acceptance of state legitimacy is 
conditioned primarily by relative experience of the state as more or less 
present, rather than whether that experience has been primarily positive or 
negative. 
References 
Abrahamsen R and Williams MC (2005) The Globalisation of Private Security: 
Country Report on Nigeria. Aberystwyth: CUP. 
Adebajo A and Landsberg C (2003) South Africa and Nigeria as regional 
hegemons. In: Baregu M and Landsberg C (eds) From Cape to Cairo: Southern 
Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges. Colorado: International Peace Academy. 
Adebanwi W and Obadare E (2011) When corruption fights back: Democracy 
and elite interest in Nigeria’s anti-corruption war. Journal of Modern African 
Studies 49(2): 185–213. 
Adler G and Steinberg J (eds) (2000) From Comrades to Citizens: The South 
African Civics Movement and the Transition to Democracy. Houndmills: 
Macmillan. 
Akinkugbe OO and Joda A (2013) Olusegun Obasanjo: The Presidential Legacy, 
1999–2007. Ibadan, Nigeria: Bookcraft. 
Altbeker A (2007) A Country at War with Itself. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers. 
Anderson E (1994) The code of the streets. Chicago 111: 81–94. 
Apter A (2005) The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in 
Nigeria. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Baker B (2002a) Living with non-state policing in South Africa: The issues and 
dilemmas. Journal of Modern African Studies 40(1): 29–53. 
Baker B (2002b) When the Bakassi boys came: Eastern Nigeria confronts 
vigilantism. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20(2): 1–22. 
Baker B (2003) Policing and the rule of law in Mozambique. Policing and 
Society 13(2): 139–158. 
Baker B (2004a) Protection from crime: What is on offer for Africans? Journal 
of Contemporary African Studies 22(2): 165–188. 
Baker B (2004b) Multi-choice policing in Africa: Is the continent following the 
South African pattern? Society in Transition 35(2): 204–223. 
Baker B (2008) Multi-choice policing in Africa. Nordic Africa Institute. 
Ballard R (2005) Social movements in post-apartheid South Africa: An 
introduction. In: Jones P and Stokke K (eds) Democratising Development: The 
Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa. 64. 77–100.  
Bayley D (1994) Police for the Future. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Benjamin W (1996) Zur kritik der gewalt. In: Critique of Violence, selected 
writing (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bierschenk T and Olivier de Sardan JP (2014) States at Work: Dynamics of 
African Bureaucracies. Leiden: Koninkilijke Brill. 
Bittner E (1967) The police on skid-row: A study of peace keeping. American 
Sociological Review 32(5): 699–715. 
Blundo G and Olivier de Sardan J-P (2006) Everyday Corruption and the State: 
Citizens and Public Officials in Africa. South Africa: David Philip. 
Bodea C and LeBas A (2014) The origins of voluntary compliance: Tax attitudes 
in Urban Nigeria. Draft paper. 
Bourgois P (2003) In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Braithwaite J (2000) The new regulatory state and the transformation of 
criminology. British Journal of Criminology 40(2): 222–238. 
Brodeur J-P (2007) An encounter with Egon Bittner. Crime Law and Social 
Change 48: 105–132. 
Bruce D (1997) Community safety and security: Crime prevention and 
development at the local level. African Security Review 6(4). 
Buur L (2003) Crime and punishment on the margins of the post-apartheid 
state. Anthropology and Humanism 28(1): 23–42. 
Buur L (2005) Sovereignty and democratic exclusion in the new South Africa. 
Review of African Political Economy 32(104/105): 253–268. 
Buur L (2006a) Democracy and its discontents: Vigilantism, sovereignty and 
human rights in South Africa. Review of African Political Economy 35(118): 
571–584. 
Buur L (2006b) Reordering society: Vigilantism and expressions of sovereignty 
in Port Elizabeth’s townships. Development and Change 37(4): 735–757. 
Buur L (2008) Fluctuating personhood: Vigilantism and citizenship in Port 
Elizabeth’s townships. In: Pratten D and Sen A (eds) Global Vigilantes. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 127–150. 
Buur L (2009) The horror of the mob: The violence of imagination in South 
Africa. Critique of Anthropology 29(1): 27–46. 
Buur L and Jensen S (2004) Introduction: Vigilantism and the policing of 
everyday life in South Africa. African Studies 63(2): 139–152. 
Buur L and Kyed H-M (2006) Contested sources of authority: Re-claiming state 
sovereignty by formalising traditional authority in Mozambique. Development 
and Change 37(4): 847–869. 
Chalfin B (2011) Neoliberal Frontiers: An Ethnography of Sovereignty in West 
Africa. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Clancy A, Hough M, Aust R, et al. (2001) Crime, Policing and Justice: The 
Experience of Ethnic Minorities: Findings from the 2000 British Crime Survey. 
Home Office Research Study 223. London: Home Office. 
Cooper-Knock SJ (2014a) Policing in intimate crowds: Moving beyond ‘the 
mob’ in South Africa. African Affairs 113(453): 563–582. 
Cooper-Knock SJ (2014b) Everyday policing, statehood and sovereignty in 
South Africa: A case study of responses to theft and robbery in eThekwini. 
DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford. 
Crawford A (2006) Networked governance and the post-regulatory state? 
Steering, rowing and anchoring the provision of policing and security. 
Theoretical Criminology 10(4): 449–479. 
Desai A (2004) The cape of good dope? A post-apartheid story of gangs and 
vigilantes. CCS Report, Durban. 
Diphoorn T (2013) Twilight policing: Private security in Durban, South Africa. 
PhD Thesis, University of Utrecht. 
Gratz T and Kirsch T (2010) Vigilantism, state ontologies, and encompassment: 
An introductory essay. In: Gratz T and Kirsch T (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism 
in Africa. Oxford: James Curry, 1–25. 
Hansen T and Stepputat F (2001) Introduction: States of imagination. In: 
Hansen T and Stepputat F (eds) States of Imagination. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Heald S (2006) State, law, and vigilantism in northern Tanzania. African Affairs 
105(419): 265–283. 
Higazi A (2008) Social mobilization and collective violence: Vigilantes and 
militias in the lowlands of Plateau State, central Nigeria. Africa 78(1): 107–
135. 
Hills A (2000) Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalisation. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Hills A (2012) Lost in translation: Why Nigeria’s police don’t implement 
democratic reforms. International Affairs 88(4): 739–755. 
Hornberger J (2004) Your police—my police: The informal privatisation of the 
police in the inner city of Johannesburg. African Studies 63(2): 213–230. 
Hornberger J (2011) Policing and Human Rights: The Meaning of Violence and 
Justice in the Everyday Policing of Johannesburg. Johannesburg: Routledge. 
Hornberger J (2013) From General to Commissioner to General: On the 
popular state of policing in South Africa. Law and Social Inquiry 38(3): 598–
614. 
Jauregui B (2010) Shadows of the state, subalterns of the state: Police and ‘law 
and order’ in postcolonial India. PhD Thesis, University of Chicago. 
Jauregui B (2013) Beating, beacons and big men: Police disempowerment and 
delegitimation in India. Law and Social Inquiry 38(3): 643–669. 
Jensen S (2005) Above the Law: Practices of Sovereignty in Surrey Estate, Cape 
Town. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Jensen S (2008a) Gangs, Politics and Dignity in Cape Town. Oxford: James 
Currey. 
Jensen S (2008b) Policing Nkomazi: Crime, masculinity and generational 
conflicts. In: Sen A and Pratten D (eds) Global Vigilantes. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 47–68. 
Jensen S (2010) Treason and contested moralities in a coloured township. In: 
Thiranagama S and Kelly T (eds) Traitors: Suspicion, Intimacy and the Ethics of 
State-Building. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 150–168. 
Jensen S and Buur L (2004) Everyday policing and the occult: Notions of 
witchcraft, crime and ‘the people’. African Studies 63(2): 193–211. 
Johnston L (1996) What is vigilantism? British Journal of Criminology 36(2): 
220–223. 
Kotecha KC and Walker JL (1976) Police vigilantes. Society 13(3): 48–52. 
Kyed H-M (2009) Community policing in post-war Mozambique. Policing and 
Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 19(4): 354–371. 
Loader I and Walker N (2007) Civilising Security. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lund C (2006) Twilight institutions: Public authority and local politics in Africa. 
Development and Change 37(4): 685–705. 
Marks M and Wood J (2007) The South African policing ‘nexus’: Charting the 
policing landscape in Durban. South African Review of Sociology 38(2): 134–
160. 
Mattes RB (2002) South Africa: Democracy without the people? Journal of 
Democracy 13(1): 22–36. 
Meagher K (2007) Hijacking civil society: The inside story of the Bakassi Boys. 
Journal of Modern African Studies 45(1): 89–115. 
Newham G (1999) The relevance of the National Crime Prevention Strategy for 
Sustainable Development in South Africa. Research report written for the 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, June. 
Nolte I (2007) Ethnic vigilantes and the state: The O’odua people’s congress. 
South-West Nigeria International Relations 21(2): 217–235. 
Okereafoezeke N (2003) Traditional social control in an ethnic society: Law 
enforcement in a Nigerian community. Police Practice and Research 4(1): 21–
33. 
Omotola JS (2010) Elections and democratic transition in Nigeria under the 
Fourth Republic. African Affairs 109(437): 535–553. 
Oomen B (2004) Vigilantism or alternative citizenship? The rise of Mapogo a 
Mathamaga. African Studies 63(2): 153–171. 
Owen O (2013) The Police and the public: Risk as preoccupation. Sociologus 
63(1): 59–80. 
Pratten D (2008) Introduction to the politics of protection: Perspectives on 
vigilantism in Nigeria. Africa 78(1): 1–15. 
Pratten D (2010) Bodies of power: Narratives of selfhood and security in 
Nigeria. In: Kirsch T and Gratz T (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa. 
Oxford: James Curry. 
PSIRA (2011) Annual report 2010/11: Private security industry regulatory 
authority. PSIRA, Pretoria. 
Rauch J (2000) Police reform and South Africa’s transition. Paper presented at 
the South African Institute for International Affairs Conference, Johannesburg. 
Roitman J (2005) Modes of governing: The garrison-entrepot. In: Ong A and 
Collier S (eds) Global Anthropology: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as 
Anthropological Problems. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Roitman J (2006) The ethics of illegality in the Chad Basin. In: Comaroff J and 
Comaroff J (eds) Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Shearing C and Johnston L (2013) Governing Security: Explorations in Policing 
and Justice. Oxford: Routledge. 
Shearing C and Wood J (2003) Nodal governance, democracy, and the new 
‘denizens’. Journal of Law and Society 30(3): 400–419. 
South African Law Commission (2000) Conviction rates and other outcomes of 
crimes reported in eight South African police areas. SALC criminal case 
outcome research report no. Project 82, SALC, Pretoria. 
Steinberg J (2008) Thin Blue: The Unwritten Rules of Policing in South Africa. 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers with Open Society Foundation for 
South Africa. 
Steinberg J (2011) Crime prevention goes abroad: Policy transfer and policing 
in post-apartheid South Africa. Theoretical Criminology 15(4): 349–364. 
Steinberg J (2012) Security and disappointment: Policing, freedom and 
xenophobia in South Africa. British Journal of Criminology 52(2): 345–360. 
Wood J and Shearing C (2013) Imagining Security. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013. 
 
 
 
